Contested Tender Offers: An Estimate of the Hazard Function by Jaggia, Sanjiv & Thosar, Satish
© 1995 American Statistical Association Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, January 1995, Vol. 13, No. 1 
Contested Tender Offers: An Estimate 
of the Hazard Function 
Sanjiv JAGGIA 
Department of Economics, Suffolk University, Boston, MA 02108 
Satish THOSAR 
Department of Finance and Accounting, University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA 02125 
In this article we estimate the hazard function (takeover probabilities) for firms that are targets in 
unsolicited tender offers. The data support a Weibull-gamma specification and imply a hazard 
rate that increases sharply in the initial period following the bid announcement, after which it 
declines steadily. In explaining the hazard, we find that the initial bid premium has no explanatory 
power, but the onset of an auction and the proportion of institutional ownership In the target firm 
significantly enhance the hazard. Legal and financial restructuring actions by target management 
are effective in reducing the hazard, thereby prolonging the contest. 
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A problem common to many fields of inquiry concerns the 
length of time that an individual spends in a particular state 
and the probability, given this length of time (or duration), 
of his exiting that state. Duration models are used to ex­
plain how individual characteristics affect this duration and 
how the elapsed duration affects the chances of exiting that 
state. Such models have long been used in the engineering 
and medical fields; more recently they have been used in la­
bor economics to analyze unemployment and strike durations 
[see Lawless (1982) and Kiefer (1988) for comprehensive 
surveys]. 
In this article, we apply duration models to the analy­
sis of the length of time between the initiation of an un­
solicited bid for a firm and the resolution of the resulting 
takeover contest. The duration of the contest is of impor­
tance to several interested parties. For example, the Secu­
rities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) is required, under 
the Williams Act, to draft and enforce rules relating to no­
tice and waiting periods in tender offers and the withdrawal 
time allowed to stockholders. The legislative intent is to have 
the S.E.C. design rules that enable target-firm stockholders 
to make informed decisions when confronted with a tender 
offer. 
Other interested parties include bidders who would like 
to end the contest as quickly as possible to exploit what­
ever synergies they have spotted and to deter third parties 
from entering with higher bids. Target management, on the 
other hand, would prefer to delay the process so as to en­
hance their action set, possibly through the erection of bar­
riers to protect their own jobs/perquisites (managerial en­
trenchment), or to generate an auction so that stockholders 
get the best possible deal. Furthermore, risk arbitrageurs 
are interested in cashing out their positions at the optimal 
point in the takeover contest so as to maximize returns. 
Consequently, the duration of the takeover contest is im­
portant from several perspectives. Previous empirical work 
has ignored this important time dimension in takeover con­
tests. 
We use three parametric models to estimate the hazard 
function conditional on defensive actions by management 
and various target-firm characteristics. The shape parame­
ter(s) of the hazard function determine(s) how the instanta­
neous probability that a target firm will be taken over changes 
over the duration of the contest. The scale parameters, in­
fluenced by the regressors, indicate how this probability dif­
fers across firms at any given point in time. Furthermore, 
MacKinnon (1992) stressed that, because parameter esti­
mates are sensitive to the choice of the model, highly mis­
leading inferences may be reached if the underlying model 
specification is incorrect. Consequently, we implement sev­
eral model-specification tests and find that our data support 
a Weibull-gamma specification. 
The estimated hazard increases sharply in the initial pe­
riod following the bid announcement, after which it declines 
steadily. Of the defensive action measures, legal defense and 
financial restructuring are significant. We find that both vari­
ables reduce the hazard and are, therefore, instrumental in 
prolonging the contest. As regards target-firm characteris­
tics, the onset of an auction and the proportion of institu­
tional ownership enhance the hazard. The initial bid pre­
mium and regulatory intervention do not appear to affect the 
hazard. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows: In Sec­
tion I, we outline the estimation and specification testing 
procedures involving duration models. In Section 2, we de­
scribe the data-collection procedure and sample characteris­
tics. In Section 3, we describe our model search and present 
diagnostic test results. In Section 4, we present the parameter 
estimates and interpretation of the results. In Section 5, we 
make our concluding comments. 
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1. METHODOLOGY 
In duration models, it is customary to specify the para­
metric form of the model in terms of its hazard function 
rather than the probability density function (pdf) even though 
the two functions are mathematically equivalent. The haz­
ard function h(t) = f(t)/S(t), where /(t) is the pdf and 
S(t) = P(T > t) is the survivor function of T, where T 
represents the duration of the contest. The survivor function 
evaluated at timet represents the probability that the firm will 
not be taken over (will survive) until timet. Analogously, the 
hazard specifies the instantaneous probability that the target 
firm will be taken over at time t + Ct, for a very small 6, 
given that it has survived up to timet. Duration dependence 
exists when (d/dt)h(t) ::f 0, implying that the probability ofa 
takeover is affected by the length of time spent in the contest. 
Dependence is positive when (d/dt)h(t) > 0 and negative 
when (d/dt)h(t) < 0. 
For parametric estimation of duration models, one has to 
specify the a priori functional form of the hazard function. 
Duration models often employ the Weibull distribution as a 
first pass, a convention we follow in this study. The hazard 
function of the Weibull distribution conditional on the regres­
sors X is 
h(t;X) =Jl.D:f''- 1, (1.1) 
where the scale parameter f.1. is typically taken as exp(XJ)) to 
ensure the nonnegativity of the hazard function. The shape 
parameter, a, allows for positive (a> 1), negative (a < 1), 
or the absence (a= 1) of duration dependence. The Weibull 
model, however, may be restrictive because it only allows 
for monotonically increasing or decreasing hazard functions. 
For instance, it does not allow for a takeover probability that 
increases with time initially but falls thereafter. The survivor 
function of a Wei bull model is 
S(t;X) =exp(- f.l.t"). (1.2) 
A characteristic feature ofduration models is that data on 
durations are seldom complete. It is common for some ob­
servations to be right censored because the event of interest 
has not taken place by the end of the data-acquisition period. 
In our sample, we follow each takeover contest for a period of 
52 weeks. Ifat this point target firms have still not been taken 
over, they are classified as remaining independent, thereby 
representing right-censored observations. Our raw data, for 
i = 1, ... , N, consist of durations, t;, regressors, X;, and indi­
cator variable, C;, where C; =1 if the firm is taken over, 0 if 
it remains independent (censored). 
The following log-likelihood function incorporates com­
plete as well as censored observations, where a right-censored 
spell contributes a probability Pr(T > t) =S(t) rather than a 
density to the function: 
N 
£ =L)C;in(f(t;;X;)) + (1 - C;) ln(S(t;; X;))). (1.3) 
i:l 
If the model is incorrectly specified, however, the estimates 
obtained by maximizing any likelihood function may lead 
to spurious inferences (MacKinnon 1992). It is, therefore, 
crucial to test the validity of the given parametric model be­
fore any meaningful inferences can be made. 
Unlike the case of linear regression models, there is no 
natural or automatic way of defining a residual that can be 
used for testing duration models. Diagnostic tests in duration 
models are generally based on the following transformation: 
t:(t) =-ln(S(t;X)). (1.4) 
Under the null hypothesis ofno model misspecification, t: has 
a unit exponential distribution with 
S(t:) =exp(-t:) and E(t:1) =j!. (1.5) 
For a Wei bull model, t:(t) =f.ll" . The parameters are replaced 
by their maximum likelihood estimates to obtain generalized 
residuals, €, for model evaluation (Lancaster 1985). 
The property of t:, given by (1.5), is used for specifica­
tion testing in duration models. An informal graphical test 
consists of plotting - ln(S'(€)) against €, where S(€) is the 
product-limit estimate of €. If the model is correctly spec­
ified, the scatterplot clusters around a 45° line through the 
origin (see Kiefer 1988; Lawless 1982). This test, which 
works for censored data as well, is based on the visual in­
spection of departures from the 45° line. 
Generalized residuals are also used for more formal tests. 
The conditional moment restriction tests based on E(ef) =j! 
can easily be implemented using the Tauchen (1985) and 
Newey (1985) framework. For a Weibull model, a test of 
second-moment restriction, E(t:2) =2, has traditionally been 
interpreted as a test for neglected heterogeneity, caused pri­
marily by the omission of relevant regressors (see Kiefer 
1988; Lancaster 1985). Jaggia (1991) showed that the out­
come of this test can also be influenced by other types of 
misspecifications. Therefore, we interpret this test as a gen­
eral misspecification ("something is wrong") test rather than 
a test for heterogeneity per se. 
Given that some of our observations are right censored, 
the preceding residuals have to be suitably adjusted. In our 
sample, the observed duration is t = min[T, L], implying 
that an observation is complete only if it is less than the 
censoring time of L =52 weeks. Note that t:(t) no longer 
has a unit exponential distribution when data are censored. 
The memoryless property of a unit exponential distribution 
of t:(T), however, is used to derive the following result: 
E(t:(T) IT> L) =t:(L) + E(t:(T)) =t:(L) + 1. (1.6) 
Therefore, the residuals are redefined as 
e(t) =€(t) . if uncensored 
= €(t) + 1 if censored. (1 .7) 
Even though the modified generalized errors, e(t), do not have 
a unit exponential distribution, they still have a unit mean 
with variance = 1r•, where 1r• is the expected probability 
of censoring. Lancaster and Chesher (1985) provided a test 
procedure that examines whether s2 = "£.(C;/N), where s2 
is the sample variance of e(t) and "E.(C;/N) is the sample 
proportion of censored observations. The test statistic used 
to check the second-moment restriction of e(t) has an easily 
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implementable form. An ordinary least squares regression 
is run in which the left-side variable is unity and the right 
side consists of (e; - 1)2 - C; and all fJJ:.,;jfJej, where 9j{j = 
1, . .. , k) represent the parameters of the model. The test is 
computed as the sample size, N, multiplied by the uncentered 
R2 and has an asymptotic x2(1) distribution under the null. 
2. DATA AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
The sample comprises firms listed on the New York or 
American stock exchanges that were targets of tender of­
fers during the period 1978- 1985. The year 1978 is a natural 
starting point for the analysis because the rules governing the 
Williams Act were revised in late 1977. The target firm and 
Schedule 140-1 filing data were identified from the S.E.C. 
News Digest, which is published on each working day. A 
Schedule 140-1 form has to be filed by the bidder with the 
S.E.C. prior to the commencement of the tender offer. The 
public announcement date for the tender offer was identi­
fied from the Wall Street JourTUJl Index (WSn). This date 
typically coincides with the Schedule 140-1 filing date but 
in some cases precedes it. The starting date for the contest 
is the Schedule 140-1 filing date or the date of the public 
announcement according to the wsn, whichever is earlier. 
Furthermore, the wsn was scanned beyond the starting date 
to record the occurrence/dates of any ofthe following events: 
A. Intervening Events 
1. One or more forms of target management resistance 
2. Interventions by regulatory authorities 
3. Competing bids by third parties 
4. Enhanced bids by original bidder 
B. Final Outcomes 
1. Target firm gets taken over 
2. Target firm remains independent 
The ending date for the contest is recorded based on the 
wsn article summary indicating that the requisite number 
of shares were tendered. If forward scanning in the wsn for 
52 weeks did not result in recording a definitive outcome, the 
target firm was classified as remaining independent. This is 
an example of right censoring explained in Section 1. 
All14D-1 filings do not necessarily constitute contests for 
corporate control. In some cases the tender offer might be 
for less than a controlling interest or target management may 
remain passive or even acquiesce in the takeover bid. Such 
tender offers are not included in our data set because our 
study focuses only on contests for corporate control. Our 
sample consists of 152 target firms of which 25 durations 
are censored. Table 1 provides a frequency distribution of 
contest durations. Note that, of the uncensored durations, 
most firms were taken over in the 5-10 week interval. 
The data set also includes information on the following 
explanatory variables that are employed in the analysis: 
Target Management Actions 
1. Legal defense takes value 1 if target management 
responds with a lawsuit or proposes an antitakeover char­
ter amendment, 0 otherwise. The choice of this variable is 
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Table 1. Sample Duration Frequencies (N = 152) 
Duration times ( t) No. offirms 
in weeks taken over 
0 < t::; 5 16 
5 < t::; 10 59 
10 < t :S 15 25 
15 < t::; 20 13 
20 < t::; 25 6 
25 < t::; 30 3 
30 < t S 35 1 
35 < t S 40 3 
40 < f $ 45 1 
45 < t::; 50 0 
t > 50 25 
due to the Jarrell (1985) study. Jarrell concluded that target 
managements appear to take a value-maximizing gamble by 
engaging in legal defensive activity. If the filing of a law­
suit, or the threat to do so, creates a delay in the tender-offer 
process, this will have a negative influence on the hazard. 
2. Real restructuring takes value 1 if target management 
proposes some change in the asset structure, 0 otherwise. 
3. FiTUJncial restructuring takes value 1 if target manage­
ment proposes some change in the ownership structure, 0 
otherwise. 
The two variables just cited were originally characterized 
by the Dann and DeAngelo ( 1988) study. This study strongly 
indicted target management for entrenchment behavior. If 
this type of defensive activity is credible, it is expected to 
exert a negative effect on the hazard. 
Firm-Specific Characteristics 
4. Bid premium percentage represents the percentage 
excess of the first hostile-bid price over the market price of 
the firm's stock 14 working days prior to the tender-offer an­
nouncement. The idea is to select a time frame that allows 
for information leakage prior to the public announcement; the 
precedent for 14 days was set by Walkling (1985), who em­
ployed a logit model to predict takeover success. We expect 
this variable to positively influence the hazard. Our reason­
ing is that a high initial bid leaves target management less 
room to maneuver. 
5. InstitutioTUJl holdings percentage serves as a proxy for 
stockholder independence [or as a converse to insider hold­
ings; see Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988)] . Defensive ac­
tions by management may be more closely monitored in firms 
with a higher percentage ofinstitutional owners. The percent­
age of institutional holdings to total outstanding stock was 
ascertained from the Standard & Poor's Stockholder Guide 
and is expected to positively influence the hazard. 
6. Intervention by regulatory authorities takes value 1 if 
either the Federal Trade Commission or the Justice Depart­
ment intervenes by way of requesting additional information 
or mounting a court challenge to the tender offer, 0 otherwise. 
We expect regulatory intervention to reduce the hazard. 
7. Auction takes value 1 if the target firm receives at least 
one enhanced bid from the original bidder or a competing 
bid from a third-party bidder, 0 otherwise. The onset of an 
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Table 2. Sample Characteristics (N =152) 
Variables Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Duration in weeks ( t) 18.086 16.65 2.85 52 
Censoring variable (C) .835 .37 0 
Legal defense .480 .50 0 
Real restructuring .190 .39 0 
Financial restructuring .177 .38 0 1 
Initial bid premium 1.303 .18 .88 1.95 
Institutional holdings .254 .18 0 .90 
Regulation .250 .43 0 1 
Auction .868 .33 0 1 
auction process is expected to exert a positive influence on 
the hazard. 
In Table 2, we present descriptive statistics of all the vari­
ables used in the analysis. 
3. MODEL FITTING AND SPECIFICATION TESTS 
In this section we report results of specification tests, 
described in Section I, sequentially carried out on three mod­
els. Maxtmum like) ihood estimates of all models are obtained 
using the MAXLIK module of the GAUSS programming lan­
guage. The model is first estimated using the Wei bull model, 
and the corresponding graph used for evaluating this model 
is given in Figure I . Note that the focus should be on depar­
tures from the 45° line for smaller values of the generalized 
residuals. In general, as Kiefer ( 1988) reported, the accu­
racy of the product-limit estimator of the survivor function is 
better for shorter durations because inferences about longer 
durations are based on fewer observations. Consequently, the 
top right part of the graph is of negligible importance. The 
graphical test of the Wei bull model suggests considerable de­
partures from the 45° line for the relevant, lower left port ion 
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Figure 1. Graphical Test for Weibu/1 Specification. Departures 
from the straight line, especially at the lower left portion of the graph, 
imply misspecification. 
Table 3. Test Statistics Under Alternative Model Specifications 
Null Alternative Test Statistic 
Second moment restriction test 

Wei bull NotWeibull 26.22 (p =.00) 

Log-logistic Not log-logistic 5 .54 (p = .02) 

Weibull-gamma Not Weibull-gamma 2.22 (p =.14) 

Likelihood ratio test 

Wei bull Weibull-gamma 51.97 (p =.00) 

Log-logistic Weibull-gamma 21.38 (p = .00) 
NOTE: The p '" parentheses refers to the p value ol the lest slalisl ics. which are all dis· 
tribuled x 2(1) undarthe null. 
of the graph (see Fig. I). Furthermore, the formal test for the 
second-moment restric tion clearly indicates misspecification 
(see Table 3). 
The Weibull model is clearly inappropriate, which could 
be simply because the Weibull d istribution is restrictive and 
allows only for monotonic hazard rates. For instance, the a 
estimate of the Wei bull model is 1.23, wh ich implies a hazard 
function that continuously increases over time. This impli­
cation is counterintuitive because the probability of takeover 
ought to decl ine beyond some reasonable point in time. Some 
takeover bids will eventually fail e ither due to antitrust con­
siderations or because, given enough time, a determined tar­
get management wi ll implement defensive measures that are 
not in the bidder's interest to overcome. The intuition is 
further supported by the fact that most fi rms in our sample 
either were taken over within a re latively short period of time 
or remained independent (see Table I). 
To search for a more appropriate model, p.{ X) can be 
written as 
p.( X) = exp(X{J + U) = V exp( X{J). (3 .1) 
where V can be thought of as a proxy for omitted regressors 
or, more generally, some intrinsic randomness in the model. 
The survivor function for a Weibull model is 
S(t; X, V) = exp(- V exp(X ,/3)t0 ). (3.2) 
Because Vis not observable, the survivor function conditional 
only on X is 
S(t; X)= Jexp(-V exp(X{J)t")p(V) dV. (3.3) 
Once the mi xing distribution p(V) is specified, S(t; X) is com­
puted to estimate the parameters of the model. 
Several authors (Lancaster 1979; Vaupel, Manton, and 
Stallard 1979; among others) used the gamma distribution 
as a convenient mixing distribution. If p(V) represents the 
density function of a gamma variate with a unit mean and 
variance = CT2, then 
S(t; X)= [ I + CT2 exp( X,6 )t0 r 11" 2 • (3.4) 
The corresponding hazard and the density functions are 
derived similarly. Note that the preceding function (3.4) 
collapses to the Wei bull survivor function ( 1.2) for CT2 ....... 0. 
Once again it is stressed that the mixing distribution is used 
not only to compensate for omitted regressors but also to cor­
rect for an overly restrictive Wei bull hazard function. More­
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over, a Weibull-gamma model specializes to a log-logistic 
model (0'2 =.l). Such a model may be appropriate for the 
problem that we address because the hazard function of a 
log-logistic distribution declines for sufficiently large T. One 
would intuitively expect firms to be less susceptible to being 
taken over if they can successfully ward off the raider for a 
reasonably long period of time. 
Graphical and second-moment restriction tests are based 
on the generalized errors, t:, where 
(3.5) 
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for the log-logistic model and 
t: =(1/0'2 )ln(l + 0'1 exp(Xp)t") (3.6) 
for the Wei bull-gamma model. The correspOnding residuals, 
obtained by evaluating the preceding equations at their maxi­
mum likelihood estimates, are used to implement the tests 
described in Section 1. Graphical tests conducted on both 
the log-logistic and the Weibull-gamma models indicate a 
marked improvement over the Wei bull model (see the relevant 
portions ofFigs. 2 and 3 ). Thesecond-moment restriction test 
supports the Weibull- garnma model, however, whereas the 
log-logistic model is rejected at a 5% significance level (see 
Table 3). The likelihood ratio tests, computed by taking twice 
the difference between the maximized log-likelihood values 
of the null and the alternative models, are also computed. 
The results for the Weibull and log-logistic models in which 
the alternative specification is Weibull-gamma corroborate 
the finding that the Weibull-gamma model is appropriate 
(see Table 3). 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The results of the three estimated models are presented 
in Table 4. We observe that the legal defense, financial 
restructuring, institutional holdings, and auction variables 
are statistically significant at a 10% level (or better), with 
the coefficient signs being in the hypothesized direction, 
in all the models we estimate. The basic difference be­
tween the three model specifications seems to be in terms 
of the behavior of the hazard over time. As discussed in 
Section 3, the Weibull-gamma specification provides the 
best fit. 
Tabla 4. Hazard-Function Estimates Under Alternative 

Model Specifications 

Variable Weibull Log-logistic Weibull-gamma 
Constant - 4.8368 - 7.4899 - 14.4614 
(.7908) (1 .2881) (3.2632) 
Legal defense -.3844 - .8192 - 1.3734 
(.1973) (.3128) (.7160) 
Real restructuring - .4285 .1302 1.0643 
(.2493) (.4175) (.8659) 
Financial restructuring - 1.3655 - 1.7959 - 1.7136 
(.3231) (.4976) (.9291) 
Bid premium .0778 .4994 .0175 
(.5080) (.7929) (1 .6663) 
Institutional holdings 1.2146 1.5555 3.0437 
(.5261) (.8336) (1 .7108) 
Regulation .0133 - .1258 - .3839 
(.2117) (.3329) (.8193) 
Auction 1.3664 2.0503 2.2887 
(.3542) (.5393) (1 .3169) 
Q 1.2316 2.0815 6.3359 
(.0834) (.1540) (1 .3795) 
u2 6.7926 
(1 .8875) 
Log-likelihood value - 197.092 -181 .793 - 171.105 
NOTE: Standard errors are In parentheses; o and e1 2 are the shape parameters d the 
hazard models. 
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Figure 4. Simulated Weibuii-Gamma Hazard Function. The haz­
ard function for durations ranging from 1to 52 weeks is derived using 
parameter estimates and regressors evaluated at mean values. 
The shape parameters, a and u 2, for the estimated Wei bull­
gamma model are both found to be statistically significant at 
any reasonable level, indicating that the data exhibit duration 
dependence. Note that u2 is significantly different from 0 
as well as I, confirming that the alternate models, Weibull 
and log-logistic, are both inappropriate. The parameter esti­
mates of the Wei bull-gamma model are used to simulate the 
aggregate hazard function (see Fig. 4) evaluated at the mean 
value of the regressors. The firms are at no risk during the 
first 20 days due to the current notice-period requirements 
established by the S.E.C. Note that our data reflect this le­
gal requirement because the simulated aggregate hazard in 
Figure 4 is effectively 0 for weeks I and 2. Thereafter, the 
hazard rises sharply, peaks at about the seventh week, and 
then declines steadily. The steep rise in the hazard func­
tion beyond the third week can perhaps be attributed to the 
informational free-rider problem discussed by Easterbrook 
and Fischel (1981). A certain amount of search cost has to 
be incurred, to identify undervalued firms (targets), by the 
initial bidder. Since the takeover bid i~ required by S.E.C. 
regulations to be publicly announced, the target firm becomes 
vulnerable to all potential bidders, not just the initial bidder. 
The data, however, appear to suggest that, if target manage­
ment can withstand the early weeks of the contest, the risk 
of being taken over declines over time. Professional man­
agers often do not have a large ownership stake in the firm 
they manage and hence the contest is typically waged us­
ing corporate funds. Conversely, the bidder, using external 
resources, clearly has to take time-value considerations into 
account and therefore is at a disadvantage if the contest is 
prolonged. 
Besides bidders and targets, the nature of the hazard 
function is likely to be of interest to other constituencies as 
well. Regulators from the S.E.C. are responsible for drafting 
and enforcing rules relating to notice and waiting periods in 
tender offers, the withdrawal time allowed to stockholders 
and so forth. These rules are designed, within the frame­
work of the Williams Act, to permit target-firm stockholders 
to make informed decisions when confronted with a tender 
offer. For instance two of the salient rules currently govern­
ing tender offers are (1) the tender offer must remain open 
for at least 20 business days from commencement of the ten­
der offer and for 10 business days from the date the bidder 
first gives notice of increase in the offered consideration, and 
(2) any person who has deposited securities may withdraw 
them any time until the expiration of 15 business days from 
the date ofcommencement ofthe tender offer and in the event 
of a competing tender offer within 10 business days follow­
ing the date ofcommencement of the competing offer. In our 
opinion, it may be helpful to the S.E.C. to use a hazard-model 
approach in framing the appropriate rules. 
Furthermore, risk arbitrageurs are interested in cashing out 
their positions at the optimal point in the takeover contest so 
as to maximize returns. It is likely that target-firm stock price 
will be highest when the instantaneous takeover probability 
(or hazard) is at a maximum. In our sample, the optimal 
cash-out point would have been seven weeks into the contest, 
on average. Investors could estimate an individual hazard 
function once a contest gets underway and make their timing 
decisions accordingly. 
We turn next to a discussion of the variables that influence 
the relative probabilities of firms getting taken over at a given 
point in time. Of the variables that capture post-bid defensive 
actions by management, the legal defense and financial re­
structuring (proposed changes in ownership structure either 
via a self-tender or a new security issue) variables are both sig­
nificant at 10% levels. Because the coefficients on these vari­
ables are negative, they both mitigate the hazard and prolong 
the contest. The latter finding is broadly supportive of those 
reported by Dann and DeAngelo ( 1988), who reported signif­
icantly negative abnormal returns to target-firm stockholders 
around managerial resistance announcements. This has been 
interpreted in the literature as the market's downward revision 
of the probability that the takeover will go through. The real 
restructuring actions variable (proposed purchases or sales of 
assets) is found to be insignificant, however. 
The bid-premium percentage variable is insignificant, 
suggesting that the initial bid premium has no influence on 
the contest duration. Walkling (1985), however, using a logit 
model, reported that the bid premium does have a signif­
icant influence on takeover probability. Although we use 
Walkling's approach in measuring the bid-premium percent­
age, our approach is not directly comparable to the Walkling 
study for several reasons. First, the logit methodology ig­
nores the time element in takeover contests. Furthermore, 
Walkling considered both contested and uncontested ten­
der offers, but we only study the former. Finally, we do 
not include any bidder characteristics (such as percentage of 
bidder-controlled shares or solicitation fees) in our set of re­
gressors, due primarily to data limitations, but instead focus 
on various forms of target-management resistance. Note that 
119 
prior studies (cited by Walkling) also found that the initial 
bid premium does not play a significant role in the outcome 
of the contest. 
The insignificance of the bid premium is perhaps due to 
the onset of an auction, which swamps the impact of the 
initial bid. We find that the auction variable is significant 
at a 10% level. Because the auction variable has a positive 
effect on the hazard, the duration of the contest is lower for 
a firm that receives multiple bids. Clearly, once an auction 
process gets underway, the offer price is bid up and target 
management feels stockholder pressure to accept the highest 
bid. In general, if the takeover goes through, incumbent 
management is replaced. It is important to note, however, 
that in some instances target management seeks an auction 
by pursuing a "white knight" strategy. In this context, from 
management's perspective the hazard is a dilution of, rather 
than a loss of, control. 
The coefficient on the institutional holdings percentage 
variable is positive and significant at the 10% level. This 
conforms to the view that institutional holders generally exer­
cise a monitoring influence on incumbent management which 
arguably translates into pressure to accept an attractive tender 
offer. Surprisingly, regulatory intervention does not appear 
to influence the hazard. Normally one would expect that an 
antitrust objection by the Justice Department would reduce 
the chances of the takeover going through. A possible ex­
planation for this lies in the fact that most of the contests 
in our sample occurred in the 1980s, a period during which 
the Justice Department was widely perceived as adopting a 
laissez-faire attitude to corporate restructuring activity. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Previous empirical studies in the area of corporate con­
trol have generally focused on measuring stockholder wealth 
effects for the firms involved; see Jensen and Warner ( 1988) 
for a summary of the evidence. In this article, we take 
a different approach. We employ duration models to esti­
mate the hazard function for firms that are targets of hostile­
takeover bids. Our model search, based on graphical as 
well as formal specification tests, suggests that the Weibull­
gamma model is appropriate for our application. 
The estimated hazard function for the chosen model shows 
that the probability of takeover increases sharply following 
the initial bid, peaks at seven weeks, and tails off thereafter. 
This could have policy implications with respect to the time 
frames adopted by the S.E.C. for notice/waiting periods for 
tender offers. This result could also be of interest to risk 
arbitrageurs in terms of their investment timing decisions. 
We also study the influence of various defensive actions 
by management and target-firm characteristics on the hazard. 
Jaggia and Thosar: Contested Tender Offers 
We find that legal defense and financial restructuring are ef­
fective in reducing the hazard, thus prolonging the contest. 
As regards target-firm characteristics, the onset ofan auction 
process and the monitoring influence ofinstitutional investors 
apparently creates pressure on incumbent management to ca­
pitulate. 
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